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Abstract 
African democracy is still evolving since it began to take root over twenty years ago. 
There have been various forms of party fission and fusion in the quest for the 
acquisition of state power. Evidence suggests that party merger in Africa is driven by an 
entirely different set of logic from mainstream rationalizations that underpin mergers in 
developed democracies. A major drawback of merger politics in Africa is the lacuna of 
ideological barrenness, which drives the continued penchant of the political elite to 
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switch parties based on self-aggrandizing permutations. This paper offers insights into 
the party system and the underpinning motivation for mergers in African politics, 
namely, that they are essentially motivated by self-interest and driven by rational 
political calculations aimed at the capture of state power to further prebendal intentions. 
Using Nigeria as a case study, this paper evaluates the party system and provides 
raisons d’être for existing mergers. It further contends that unless ideology is brought to 
the front seat of party formation and organization, merger politics will remain a shifting 
ground of ad hocism designed for the capture of state power, and for the advancement 
of narrow politico-economic interests of select political elites. 
 
Keywords: Opposition politics, ideology, party merger, democracy, party switching, 
Nigeria, Africa. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
African countries emerged from the ashes of colonial rule in the late 
1950s and 1960s with fledgling democratic system that had prospects of 
consolidation. However, in the immediate post-independence period, the 
democratic progress was not only halted but reversed as authoritarianism 
replaced democracy across the continent. Thus, at a point in the political 
evolution of Africa as a continent, almost every country was under one form of 
authoritarian and unaccountable government or another. The pervasiveness of 
military rule in Africa is underscored by the estimate that since the 1960s and 
up to the 1990s, not less than 200 successful and failed coups d’état were 
recorded.
1
 The major reason often cited by the rampaging military putschists in 
Africa was the failure of leadership and corruption.
2
 The failure of leadership in 
Africa, in itself, could be linked to the mismanagement of the party system that 
underpinned democracy. The collapse of the party system in the immediate 
post-independence period could be linked to the contradictions that were thrown 
                                               
1  Yomi Kazeem, “What is a Coup? These 40 African Countries could Help Explain,” 
(November 6, 2017), accessed October 7, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1130009/what-is-
coup-zimbabwe-joins-40-african-countries-that-have-had-coups/; Issaka K. Souaré, “The 
African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups D’état in Africa (1952–2012): 
An Empirical Assessment,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 52, no. 1 (2014): 69-
94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X13000785. 
2  Staffan Wiking, “Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal 
Assumption of Power,” The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1983, 
accessed October 7, 2018, http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:278002/ 
FULLTEXT01.pdf; George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, The Military and Politics 
in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control (London: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2004). 
The Party System and the Politics of Party Merger and Power Contestation in Africa: Insights from Nigeria 239 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX no. 2  2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
up due to the tendency of elites to engage in exclusionary politics through one-
party system.   
However, the change in Africa’s political topography manifesting in the 
trajectory from one-party and military rule to democratic governance started 
gradually in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Thus, by 1999, the number of 
countries that had embraced multi-party constitutions had risen from 9 to 45 
with further progress recorded since then.
3
 In essence, therefore, military and 
unaccountable regimes, in their strict sense, are a rarity in contemporary Africa. 
In the wake of the current democratic dispensation, political parties were 
formed and through their instrumentality candidates for various elective offices 
were selected, constituents and electorates were mobilized, elections were 
contested, won and lost and governing coalitions were formed to carry on the 
task of governance. Interestingly, despite decades of democratic governance in 
Africa, democratic credentials are still not up to the minimum international 
benchmarks in many respects, namely internal party democratic practices, 
working party ideology, interparty dialogue and collaboration, party funding 
and discipline, and free and fair elections devoid of vote buying.
4
 Some major 
ingredients of democracy, such as periodic elections, platforms for electoral 
contests among candidates and parties, transparent political processes, and 
independent electoral umpire are at various levels of entrenchment. However, 
African political parties lack clear-cut ideological master plans which are 
capable of offering electorates credible alternatives. This has led many analysts 
to adjudge the contributions of Africa’s political parties in terms of deepening 
democratic consolidation as disappointing.
5
 It partly explains the retreat of 
democratic culture in the internal affairs of most political parties, the 
multiplicity of political parties and the electoral fraud and violence that 
characterized elections held in Africa. 
                                               
3  Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
4  Nicolas van de Walle and Kimberly Smiddy Butler, “Political Parties and Party Systems 
in Africa’s Illiberal Democracies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13, no. 1 
(1999): 14-28, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557579908400269; Vicky Randall and Lars 
Svåsand, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa,” Democratization 9, 
no. 3 (2002): 30-52, https://doi.org/10.1080/714000266; Shola J. Omotola, “Nigerian 
Parties and Political Ideology,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 1, 
no. 3 (2009): 612-634; Okechukwu Ikeanyibe, “Internal Party Democracy, Party 
Candidature, and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Politics & 
Policy 42, no.5 (2014): 769-804, https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12094; Stuti Khemani, 
“Buying Votes Versus Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to Under-Invest in 
Pro-Poor Policies,” Journal of Development Economics 117 (2015): 84-93, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.002; E. Kramon, “Where Is Vote Buying 
Effective? Evidence from a List Experiment in Kenya,” Electoral Studies 44 (2016): 397–
408, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.006. 
5  Randall and Svåsand, “Political Parties and Democratic”, 32. 
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The classic idea behind opposition politics is that opposition parties 
afford the electorates ready alternatives to the incumbent party in addition to 
serving as watchdogs and critics of the policies of the government, checking the 
activities of public officials and holding them politically accountable as a 
prelude to fulfilling their office-seeking expectations.
6
 But opposition parties in 
Africa do not approximate to these ideal specifications in terms of their role in 
consolidating democracy bearing in mind that a critical condition for the 
consolidation of democracy is the institutionalization of parties and party systems.
7
 
The seeming incapacity of political parties to win electoral contests in 
order to dislodge a dominant party provides the rationale for coalition-building 
in the form of merger of parties. In this paper, we conceptualize party merger in 
terms of consensual fusion or integration of one or more political parties to form 
a bigger and stronger political entity. The major drawbacks of party merger 
essentially consist of identity loss or, at the very least, the dilution of the 
ideological distinctiveness of merged parties and the importation of 
sociopolitical “baggages” into the merged union which could have a detrimental 
effect on efforts to institutionalize a new culture and organization that are 
undoubtedly expected to be part of the new party. Scholars have pointed out that 
party mergers are more frequent in new democracies than in established ones 
due to the differences in the levels of party system institutionalization.
8
 This is 
true of Africa’s democratic system, which is characterized by a seemingly 
endless pattern of party coalitions, splits and mergers. 
By focusing on Nigeria, the article interrogates party system and party 
merger within the context of power contestation and their overall implication 
for the consolidation of democracy. Between 1999 and 2006, opposition politics 
was practically dead in Nigeria. Its resuscitation followed the merger of several 
parties that metamorphosed into the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in 2006 
and the subsequent merger arrangement in 2013 that led to the establishment of 
a mega party, the All Progressives Congress (APC). The whole essence of 
merger politics is to introduce necessary robustness in political contests within 
                                               
6  Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Muller, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” in Policy, Office or 
Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, ed. W.C. Muller and K. 
Strøm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-35; Agnes Ngoma Leslie, “Zambia and 
China: Workers’ Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State 
Engagement,” African Studies Quarterly 16, nos. 3-4, (2016): 89-106. 
7  Randall and Svåsand, “Political Parties and Democratic,” 34; Michelle Kuenzi and Gina 
Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s Electoral Regimes,” 
Party Politics. 11, no. 4 (2005): 423–446, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068805053211. 
8  Dafydd Fell, “Merger and Takeover Attempts in Taiwanese Party Politics,” Issues & 
Studies 53, no. 4 (2017): 1750010, https://doi.org/10.1142/s1013251117500102; Nicole 
Bolleyer, Raimondas Ibenskas and Daniel Keith, “The Survival and Termination of Party 
Mergers in Europe,” European Journal of Political Research 55, no. 3 (2016): 642–659, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12143. 
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democratic settings. Thus, its logic is encapsulated in the quest to advance 
political development through a political “marriage of convenience” for a 
variety of reasons which could range from consolidating ideology, expanding 
membership base, controlling the executive or the legislature, dislodging a 
dominant party to winning power.
9
 In examining the terrain of opposition and 
merger politics in Nigeria, this paper found that the motive for merger is 
incongruent with dominant rationale for it in established democratic settings 
elsewhere. The major thrust and preoccupation of merger in Africa and 
particularly Nigeria is to capture power which in itself is driven by the 
imperatives of prebendalism.
10
  
 
 
Problematizing and Theorizing Party System and Opposition 
Politics in Africa 
 
The critical role of political parties in the democratic process is based on 
the ensembles of roles they perform which range from bridging the gap between 
the state and the civil society, aggregating public interests, integrating and 
mobilizing the citizenry, socializing and recruiting political leaders to 
organizing governmental activities for party in power.
11
 The theoretical 
explanation of party system and opposition politics in Africa must begin from 
an in-depth appreciation of the nature of party formation and its pivotal role in 
the capture of state power and attendant accumulation of wealth among the 
elites. Salih has posited that the factors that influenced the emergence and 
consolidation of African political parties varied immensely from the experience 
of Western political parties.
12
 The differences are located in their histories and 
circumstances, especially the impact of colonialism. The truncation of 
democratic development in Africa, in the 1960s and subsequently, contributed 
immensely in fossilizing party system and opposition politics in Africa. 
However, the “third wave of democratization” rekindled democratic culture in 
                                               
9  Raimondas Ibenskas, “Marriages of Convenience: Explaining Party Mergers in Europe,” 
The Journal of Politics 78, no 2 (2016): 343–356. 
10  Prebendalism refers to the conversion of privileged positions into instruments of acquiring 
and dispensing benefits, especially from the state, see Richard Joseph, Democracy and 
Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare (Eds.), 
Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretations (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
11  Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party Systems,”; Sebastian Elischer, Political Parties in Africa: 
Ethnicity and Party Formation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
12  M. A. Mohamed Salih, “Introduction: The Evolution of African Political Parties,” in 
African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance, ed. M. A. 
Mohamed Salih (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 1-33. 
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the continent. The value of democracy over authoritarianism is that the affairs 
of the state are conducted in ways compatible with the interests and wishes of 
the people.
13
  
The major challenge that democracy encountered in Africa was the 
transmutation of authoritarian regimes into democratic government which 
created artificial democratic structures. What these erstwhile authoritarian 
regimes did was to reconfigure their governance structure to accommodate 
certain key democratic ideals with implication for party system and opposition 
politics. Helgesen has noted that “strong and sustainable democracy is 
dependent on the existence of well-functioning political parties. … [as they are] 
crucial actors in bringing together diverse interests, recruiting and presenting 
candidates, and developing competing policy proposals that provide people with 
a choice.”14 Political parties are also relevant in nondemocratic political 
settings. As Salih has pointed out, “in competitive systems, parties are 
organized by politicians to win elections; in authoritarian systems, parties are 
organized to affect the attitudes and behavior of the population.”15  
Party formation in Africa has always been influenced by such factors as 
ethno-religious permutations, the cult of personalities and the overt or covert 
support of those in power at the period. Political parties in Africa 
metamorphosed from ethno-cultural groups and so, from their formation, they 
set boundaries on their aims and objectives, which were tailored to satisfy 
parochial, ethno-regional interests.
16
 With a narrow mindset, in terms of goals 
and basis for solidarity, a majority of political parties in Africa lack national 
character to be able to offer valid alternatives. And yet, political parties are the 
dominant components of Africa’s democracy and core platforms for electoral 
contests owing to the near absence of independent candidacy. In other words, in 
most African countries, the political parties are the only platforms through 
which aspiring candidates can compete for elective public offices.
17
 Thus, there 
has been a constant need for party mergers to create a semblance of national 
party structure that can win elections across ethnic boundaries. This scenario 
has also thrown up weak and pseudo-opposition structures in most African 
political systems. 
                                               
13  Mathurin C Houngnikpo, Africa's Elusive Quest for Development. (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006).  
14  Vidar Helgesen, “Preface,” in Political Parties in West Africa: The Challenge of 
Democratization in Fragile States, ed. Said Adejumobi (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007), accessed June 30, 2018, 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/political-parties-in-west-africa-
challenge-of-democractization-in-fragile-states.pdf. 
15  Salih, “Introduction,” 3. 
16  Ibid., 3. 
17  Adejumobi, Political Parties in West Africa, 44. 
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Essentially, opposition politics is a fundamental attribute of democracy, 
although it could also be present in nondemocratic settings. Liberal-democratic 
theories recognize and assign certain roles to opposition politics such as serving 
in the interval between one election and the next as the formal, institutionalized 
watchdog to keep the ruling party in check and provide the electorates with 
choices, politically, ideologically and policy-wise.
18
 In the context of liberal 
democratic theories, opposition politics bestows dynamism on democracy 
through the conferment of rights on “political and social actors to publicly 
criticize and challenge the government, its actions, and policies.”19 In other 
words, opposition politics constitutes a mechanism through which political 
actors jostle for state power as well as attempt to displace the incumbent 
government on account of its shortcomings.
20
  
The essential characteristic of opposition politics is that it is the 
continuation of struggle for power between dominant and peripheral political 
parties after the conclusion and formation of a government. In other words, 
political parties which lost an election but mustered a reasonable percentage of 
popular votes and seats in the national legislature drive opposition politics. The 
whole idea of opposition politics is for political parties to engage in post-
election activities, such as criticizing government policies and proffering 
alternative routes to good governance.
21
 Thus, the vehicle that drives opposition 
politics is the political party and interfaced by the people. As a matter of fact, 
opposition politics confers the title of government-in-waiting on the party that 
has the next majority. But, the relevance and robustness of opposition politics is 
measured by how proactive it is in evolving counter-policy alternatives to 
address the shortcomings of government policies.  
Our theory of coalition politics builds on the premise that the multiplicity 
of political parties in Africa’s political arena and their relative incapacity to 
provide real competition to the ruling parties or offer credible alternative to the 
electorates led to mergers. Coalition building entails cooperative arrangements 
based on payoffs. The nature of payoffs could be the achievement of economies 
of scale or the reduction of uncertainty in electoral outcomes, both of which are 
                                               
18  Adebayo Olukoshi, “Economic Crisis, Multipartyism and Opposition Politics in 
Contemporary Africa,” in The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa, ed. 
Adebayo O. Olukoshi (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 1998), 8-38; Eva Kolinsky, 
“Introduction”, in Opposition in Western Europe, ed. Eva Kolinsky (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2016), 1-7. 
19  Nathalie Brack and Sharon Weinblum, “‘Political Opposition’: Towards a Renewed 
Research Agenda,” Interdisciplinary Political Studies l.1, no. 1 (2011): 69, accessed 
October 17, 2018. http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/idps/article/download/ 17257/14767. 
20  Ludger Helms, “Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues 
and Perspectives,” The Journal of Legislative Studies 14, no. 1 (2008): 6-19.  
21  Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003). 
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geared towards winning state power.
22
 Several scholars have made important 
contributions to the development of coalition theories with regard to political 
competition and governance.
23
 However, in addition to the parameters identified 
by Gamson as motorizing coalition such as the initial distribution of resources, 
payoffs or rewards, non-utilitarian preferences and effective decision point; and 
the bargaining parameter identified by Lupia and Strom, the environment and 
the nature of the state play a significant role in determining the nature of coalition.
24
 
Although coalition building is dependent on the commonality of choices 
among opposition parties,
25
 however, the interests of the leaderships of these 
parties determine the nature and trajectory of such coalitions. This is so because 
many of the opposition parties are essentially launched as vehicles for key 
individuals to win state power.
26
 African opposition political parties are in this 
category. It must be appropriate to point out that democracy in Africa is not 
exactly as it is in developed countries where democratic governance has been in 
place for centuries. While developed democracies are anchored in 
institutionalized political pluralism, the African variant, although possessing the 
attributes of multipartyism, is akin to political monopoly. Certain 
environmental, socio-cultural and economic factors have interfered with, and 
dictated a modification of the ideal democratic tenets in the African political 
setting. These modifications make it difficult for the opposition groups to play 
the role assigned by liberal democratic theories.  
There is also the “people angle” to opposition politics. The theoretical 
inference that may be drawn from the tenets of liberal democracy is the 
inevitability of the people in the emergence, institutionalization and 
consolidation of opposition politics. However, in Africa, low literacy level and 
pervasive poverty tend to blind the people to the relevance of opposition 
politics. Opposition politics thrives where a large percentage of the populace is 
aware of issues at stake. This knowledge enables them to make sense of the 
various ideological positions and policy preferences. An aspect of the “people 
angle” is the cynical perception among the people that all politicians are the 
same and therefore not capable of presenting real alternatives.  
                                               
22  Heemin Kim, “Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: The 1990 Party Merger 
in Korea,” Comparative Politics 30, no. 1 (1997): 83-100; Amrita Dhillon, “Political 
Parties and Coalition Formation,” 2003, accessed June 30, 2018, http://www2.warwick. 
ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/dhillo n/publications/bookchapter1.pdf. 
23  William A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review 26, 
no. 3 (1961): 373-382.  
24  Gamson, “A Theory”; Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom, “Coalition Termination and the 
Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 
3 (1995): 648–665, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082980. 
25  Francesco Cavatorta, “‘Divided they Stand, Divided they fail’: Opposition Politics in 
Morocco,” Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 137-156. 
26  Olukoshi, “Economic Crisis, Multipartyism,” 30. 
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The implication of this is the nonchalance of the electorates to party 
system as well as the prevalence of vote buying. Both of these dispositions, 
especially vote-buying, have undermined the relevance of opposition politics 
considering the influence of money in the face of poverty. Vote buying is all 
about the direct exchange of electoral support for rewards and material goods 
between voters and political patrons at the level of the individual or small 
group.
27
 Jensen and Justesen have noted that the widespread poverty in Africa 
makes this exchange through vote-buying a more common political strategy 
during elections.
28
 Thus, the prominence of vote buying in electioneering has 
redefined politics by creating a detrimental patronage system that undermines 
the freewill of the populace in making electoral choices, as well as vitiates the 
entrenchment of democratic tenets, and allows the perpetuation of pseudo-
dictators and unaccountable leaders.
29
  
In Nigeria, the distribution of material resources across the broad spectra 
of class formations has engendered indifference in the political behavior and 
electoral disposition of the people towards opposition politics generally.
30
 The 
extreme fragmentation and fractionalization of the opposition has tended to 
weaken it. For instance, shortly before the 2003 general elections, there were 30 
political parties. This number increased to 50 in 2007. As at the period of the 
2011 general elections, there were 63 political parties, which were mutants of 
both the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and other major opposition parties. 
Expectedly, most of them failed to win any seat into either subnational or 
national legislatures since their registration by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC).
31
 Notwithstanding the merger arrangement that 
produced the APC and deregistration of some 31 political parties in 2012,
32
 the 
                                               
27  Simeon Nichter, “Conceptualizing Vote Buying,” Electoral Studies 35 (2014): 315–327, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.02.008. 
28  Peter S. Jensen and Mogens K. Justesen, “Poverty and Vote Buying: Survey-based 
Evidence from Africa,” Electoral Studies, 33 (2014): 220–232, https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.020. 
29  Susan C. Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, 
ed. Robert E. Goodin 2013, accessed June 30, 2018, http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/ 
view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-031; 
Nichter, “Conceptualizing Vote Buying,” 316-317. 
30  Michael Bratton, “Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns,” Electoral 
Studies 27, no. 4 (2008): 621–632, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2008.04.013. 
31  Aduku A. Akubo and Adejo Umoru Yakubu, “Political Parties and Democratic 
Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Global Journal of Political Science and 
Administration 2, no. 3 (2014): 79-108. 
32  Joseph Erunke, “INEC de-registers three more parties,” Vanguard, December 22, 2012, 
accessed June 30, 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/12/inec-de-registers-three-
more-parties/. 
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current number of political parties in Nigeria is 91
33
. Thus, despite the anecdotal 
evidence that the masses were disenchanted with both the APC and PDP, and 
the obvious need for a “third political force” in Nigeria, the political elite could 
not broker a political coalition for the 2019 general elections. Thus, a total of 91 
parties presented candidates for various positions across the country. 
 
 
Interrogating the Party System in Africa: 
Issues and Challenges 
 
The contemporary democratic renaissance in Africa started in the 1990s 
when democracy was adopted on the continent. As Thomson observes, “from 
Tunisia to Mozambique, from Mauritania to Madagascar, government after 
government was forced to compete in multi-party elections against new or 
revitalized opposition movements.”34 Prior to this period, much of Africa was 
either under one-party regimes or the jackboots of authoritarian and 
unaccountable government. This was an aberration as African countries had 
started their independent national life with the apparatuses of democratic 
governance. However, these democratic institutions were soon dismantled and 
replaced with various forms of authoritarian regimes. Thus, party systems had 
existed in Africa prior to the new wave of democratization that swept across the 
continent in the 1990s.
35
  
However, the third wave’s expansion of democracy in Africa threw up 
new parties and different types of party systems with their own characteristics 
and consequences.
36
 At the initial period, the retreating authoritarian regimes 
imposed political parties that won the first set of elections. The nature and 
characteristics of these parties included the lack of institutionalization, 
personalistic politics and internal factionalism.
37
   
 
 
 
                                               
33  Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), “Political Parties,” accessed June 
30, 2018, https://www.inecnigeria.org/political-parties/. 
34  Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, 228. 
35  Giovanni M. Carbone, “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and 
Research Perspectives,” World Political Science Review 3, issue 3 (2007): 1-29. 
36  Renske Doorenspleet, “Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” in African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance, ed. 
M. A. Mohamed Salih (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 169-187. 
37  Oda van Craneburgh, “Power and Competition: The Institutional Context of African 
Multi- Party Politics,” in African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and 
Governance, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 188-206.  
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Table 1: The Nature of Political Regimes in Africa as at 1989 
Source: Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African, Giovanni M. Carbone, “Political Parties.”  
 
Since the early attempts at democratization, there has been some progress 
as several African countries have experienced some levels of democratic 
turnover with more or less an institutionalized party system.
38
 According to 
Thomson, “more than 140 multi-party elections were held in the last decade of 
the twentieth century (compared with less than 70 competitive polls held in the 
three decades prior to this.”39 But this does not suggest that party system akin to 
what is obtainable in established liberal democracies has taken root. African 
political terrain is still characterized by inchoate party system where political 
affiliations are in constant flux, new political parties are constantly emerging 
and electoral contests are highly volatile.
40
 In other words, the 
institutionalization of the party system in Africa is low with serious 
repercussions on key elements of democracy such as participation, 
representation, accountability and contestation. 
The underlying basis for the low level of party system institutionalization 
can be located in the undifferentiated nature of the parties based on what van de 
                                               
38  Rachel Beatty Riedl, Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
39  Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, 236. 
40  Noam Lupu and Rachel Beatty Riedl, “Political Parties and Uncertainty in Developing 
Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 11 (2012): 1339–1365. 
DOI:10.1177/0010414012453445. 
Authoritarian Regimes  Pluralist Regimes 
Military 
Regimes 
One-Party Regimes Monarchies Inclusive 
Multipartyism 
Racial 
Oligarchies 
Burkina 
Faso, 
Burundi, 
Chad, 
Ghana, 
Guinea, 
Lesotho, 
Liberia, 
Mauritania, 
Niger, 
Nigeria, 
Sudan, 
Uganda 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo, 
Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Guinea Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and 
Principe, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, 
Zambia 
Morocco, 
Swaziland 
Botswana, 
Egypt, Liberia, 
Mauritius, 
Senegal, 
Sudan, The 
Gambia, 
Tunisia, 
Zimbabwe, 
South 
Africa, 
Namibia 
N = 12 N = 28 N=2 N = 9 N = 2 
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Walle has called “programmatic homogeneity”41 in the manifestoes of various 
political parties. Thus, all the political parties tend to have the same set of 
programs with no basis for ideological uniqueness. This lack of ideological 
uniqueness makes parties to be less reliant on programmatic appeals as basis for 
voter mobilization. Across Africa, ideology, as a component of political 
mobilization strategies, appears to be in short supply in party systems and 
politics.
42
  
Like most concepts in the arena of politics, ideology has both negative 
and positive attributes, mainly because of the competing epistemological and 
methodological disputations.
43
 But in the various strands of the 
conceptualization of ideology, several areas of synergy or agreement are 
discernible. The specific attributes of ideology include beliefs, values, and 
ideals arising from or connected to the facts and incidences of life. These 
attributes are closely fused into a system that forms the basis for a social, 
economic or political philosophy, which ultimately stipulates, reconciles, 
arranges and harmonizes values and thus shapes the way a person or group 
thinks, acts, and understands the world.
44
  
Ideology, as a social construct, is the organizing principle that binds like-
minded individuals together in a group or groups for the pursuit of a common 
goal. It is not just the pursuit of goals that determines ideology; values and 
norms also play significant roles. It is values and norms that will ensure 
consistency in the strategies to be adopted in the pursuit of specified goals. 
Essentially, within the realms of party politicking, ideology performs three 
essential roles: it serves as a cognitive goggle for looking at society holistically; 
a template for fixing the developmental shortcomings of the society; and, a tool 
for managing conflicts, mobilizing electoral support, and legitimizing the quest 
for power.
45
 The centrality of ideology as a driving force of politics led Nnoli to 
assert, “there can be no politics without ideology, and no ideology without politics.”46 
The problem of ideology in African politics is linked to the nature of its 
political evolution and the influence of such forces as ethnicity, class alliances 
and the forces of one-party system. Political party engineering into multi-
                                               
41  Nicolas van de Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party 
Systems,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2, (2003): 304. 
42  Karen E. Ferree, “The Social Origins of Electoral Volatility in Africa,” British Journal of 
Political Science 40, no. 4 (2010): 759–779, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123410000244. 
43  John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 
(1997): 957-999; Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (New York: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2004).  
44  John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier, “Political Ideology: Its 
Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities,” The Annual Review of Psychology 60 
(2009): 307–337. 
45  Omotola, “Nigerian Parties and Political Ideology,” 614.  
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partyism was crafted through four major paths, namely, the broadening of the 
political space by reconfiguring former single parties that had dominated 
political life in many countries prior to the new era of democratization as in 
Angola, Cameroun, Zimbabwe; formation of new parties by politicians and 
technocrats who had already achieved public figure status like in Nigeria, 
Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya; establishment of new parties by civil society 
organizations and networks in countries like Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe; and 
conversion of liberation and guerrilla movements to political platforms 
including their pacifist integration into constitutional framework for 
involvement in governance as in Ethiopia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, South Africa, Liberia.
47
 
Since the democratic wave that birthed the present dispensation, most 
African countries dispensed with one-party system and embraced multi-party 
politics. Multi-partyism, which ought to have provided a platform for the robust 
thriving of ideologies, both in terms of idealistic appeal and as a basis for mass 
mobilization, became trapped in programmatic identicalness.  
 
 
The Nigerian Context: the Party System and the Path to Re-
Democratization 
 
Both external and internal factors made re-democratization possible in 
Nigeria. Such external factors like the end of the Cold War, agreements among 
state elites, civil society and international agencies to embrace political 
pluralism, global support for democracy and the unpopularity of unaccountable 
government across the world motorized democratic rebirth. While recognizing 
the overarching impacts of the foregoing external factors, our attention will be 
centered on the internal dynamics that engendered re-democratization in 
Nigeria. Opposition to military rule was championed and sustained by alienated 
elites, civil society activists and various segments of the Nigerian masses. This 
opposition initially resulted in the political transition program and the 
presidential election of June 12, 1993 and later, the transition program that 
birthed the present democratic dispensation. The annulment of the 1993 
presidential election by the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) 
and subsequent human rights abuses orchestrated by the military regime of Sani 
Abacha (1993-1998) catalyzed national and international coalitions for 
democracy. The death of Abacha and the emergence of Abdulsalami Abubakar 
as military head of state facilitated the re-democratization process. 
                                               
47  Carbone, “Political Parties,” 4-5; Raymond Suttner, “Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation in South Africa: The Advice of ‘the Experts’,” Current Sociology 52, no. 5 
(2004): 755–773, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392104045367. 
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The annulment of the 1993 presidential election led to the formalization of 
the institution of resistance through the instrumentality of civil society groups, 
especially the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and ethnic militias, such 
as the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) and various militant groups in the Niger 
Delta.
48
 However, it was the death of Abacha and Abiola in 1998 and the 
emergence of a group of 34 eminent Nigerians called G-34 that opened a new 
political chapter that ushered in the current democratic dispensation. Although it 
might seem that G-34 was motivated by the need to save Nigeria from dictatorship, 
it was really motivated by the political ambitions of its membership.
49
 The motive 
of G34 was in line with Cavatorta’s observation that opposition groups would force 
the incumbent for the purpose of opening up the political system for the realization 
of their political ambitions.
50
 In terms of ideological leaning, the membership of this 
group was eclectic. In other words, the group was a constellation of men of 
different ideological persuasions.  
 The various frontline pro- and anti-military rule groups, including the 
G-34, People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), NADECO, and ethno-national 
groups transformed into political parties and formed the nucleus of what later 
came to be known as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party 
(later changed to All Nigerian Peoples Party and fused into the All Progressives 
Congress) and Alliance for Democracy (AD).
51
 The lack of a sound ideological 
base in these parties haunted them but had more devastating impact on AD. A 
faction of AD later transformed to Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and to the 
mega-coalition, the All Progressive Congress (APC). 
 
 
Challenging the Constellation: The Politics of Merger and the 
New Spirit of Opposition 
  
Early attempts at governments of coalition and accord  
 
Party formation and consolidation in Nigeria have always relied on the 
twin-primordialism of ethno-cultural affinities and class alliances. Scholars 
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Provisions of the 1995 Constitution,” 2005, accessed June 30, 2018, 
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have observed that ethnicity, as a defining characteristic of Nigeria’s social 
structure, has always played very crucial role in the origins and developmental 
trajectory of political parties.
52
 Thus, the Nigerian political arena, from the 
parliamentary system of the first republic, to the presidential system of second 
to fourth republics is plagued with various forms of attempts by the elite to 
forge a united political force. The Nigerian political lexicon is filled with such 
concepts as pact, alliance, accord, coalition and merger, all of which depict 
collaborative attempts by the elites to share state power. These attempts had 
taken three forms: collaboration towards forming a government; pooling 
political resources to share governmental positions; and coming together to 
dislodge the party in power.  
In the first republic’s parliamentary system (1960-1966), there was a 
coalition government between the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). With the collapse of the 
coalition arrangement due to inter-regional rivalry and disagreement over the 
1962 census figures, the election of 1965 was marred by electoral irregularities 
following desperate attempts to control the federal government through 
alliances and coalitions.
53
 However, the coalition party, Nigerian National 
Alliance (NNA) of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was asked by the President, Nnamdi 
Azikiwe to form a government that was broad-based and national in character.
54
 
In the second republic (1979-1983) Nigeria adopted a presidential system 
of government. The ethnic and class character of parties made it difficult for any 
of the then five major political parties to have clear majority in the National 
Assembly. Thus, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigerian People’s 
Party (NPP) reached an accord. The whole essence of the accord was for both 
parties to team up in controlling the National Assembly. The accord made it 
possible for NPN with its 36 out of 95 senatorial seats to produce the senate 
president and the NPP with its 16 senatorial seats, the deputy senate president. 
Also, in the House of Representatives, the NPP produced the speaker and the 
NPN, deputy speaker despite the fact that these parties controlled 17.4% and 
37.8% of House seats respectively.
55
 In the run-up to the 1983 general elections, 
the accord broke down leading to a realignment of political forces and political 
desperation that ultimately led to the demise of democracy in Nigeria until 
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1999. The major reason that appeared to have motivated various political 
parties, in both the first and second republics, to attempt a coalition was the 
desire to win and share power rather than pursue people-oriented and 
developmental policies and programs. 
What normally makes opposition parties to thrive is the existence of 
contradictions in the polity. It is often said that nobody changes a winning team. 
But, with poverty deepening progressively and insecurity bedeviling the country 
and reversing all socio-economic parameters since 1999, one would have 
expected a political revolution. But no such revolution took place in 2003, 2007 
and 2011 when Nigerians went to the polls. In established democracies, there is 
an entrenched political activism that is people-driven. Contrariwise, political 
activism in Nigeria is elite-driven rather than mass-driven. Thus, the speculation 
of some analysts that the contradictions in the country ought to have had 
catalytic effect in redefining opposition politics tended to display limited understanding 
of the elite-driven and prebendal nature of Nigeria’s political setting.56  
 
 
Opposition politics and party merger 
 
Since the take-off of Nigeria’s fourth republic, opposition parties had 
made three major attempts at coalition. The first was the AD/APP alliance for 
the 1999 election; the second was the merger of several parties that 
metamorphosed into Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in 2006 and the last 
was the merger that produced the APC in 2013. At the inception of the fourth 
republic, the first three political parties, by virtue of their electoral performance 
in the first set of elections, were the PDP, APP (later renamed ANPP), and AD. 
While the PDP recorded well-spread electoral fortune across Nigeria’s 
geopolitical zones, the APP and AD were dominant in designated geopolitical 
zones, namely the north and southwest respectively. The similarity in their 
pattern of geopolitical dominance informed their eventual pact to present a joint 
candidate in the 1999 presidential election. That pact was aimed at pooling their 
strengths together to outperform the PDP.  
The context of the APP/AD political pact could not be categorized as 
opposition alliance because in 1999 when the first general elections were 
                                               
56  Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa, “Effective Opposition as an Antidote against Abuse of Power 
by the Executive in Nigeria,” A Paper Delivered at the International Conference On 
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London, South Kessington Campus on Saturday 25th, June 2005, accessed May 10, 2018, 
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conducted, there was no dominant party per se. Unfortunately, the lessons of 
that alliance, which would have guided a more robust opposition politics, were 
not consolidated. It was sacrificed on the altar of ethnic rivalry and mistrust as 
both the ANPP and AD maintained a hardline stance of fielding presidential 
candidates from their respective geopolitical strongholds in subsequent 
elections. 
The second attempt at coalition was in 2006 when the Alliance for 
Democracy, the Justice Party, the Advanced Congress of Democrats, and some 
other small parties merged and transformed into Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN). The central idea that seemed to have motivated the merger was to 
rekindle the dying embers of opposition politics in Nigeria. At that time, it 
seemed as if the PDP was on a deliberate political mission to transform the 
country into a one-party state. For instance, in the 2003 general elections, the 
PDP depleted the political fortunes of the ANPP and AD in both gubernatorial 
and National Assembly elections. It secured more than a quarter of the votes in 
32 of the 36 states in the presidential election and particularly took over the 
South-west zone that was hitherto controlled by the AD by winning five of the 
six gubernatorial positions; 11 of the 16 senatorial seats and 38 of the 60 House 
of Representatives’ seats.57   
The 2006 merger that produced the ACN rekindled the fire of opposition 
politics with the objective being to take over the federal government. In pursuit 
of this objective, the ACN fielded the former Vice President of Nigeria, Atiku 
Abubakar as its presidential candidate for the 2007 presidential election. 
Although Atiku did not win the presidency, the party recorded success in the 
National Assembly elections in the South West with 6 Senatorial seats and 31 
House of Representatives seats.  
The regional pattern of ACN’s victory in the 2007 general elections made 
the cultivation of alliances imperative if it must generate the kind of national 
muscle required to dislodge the PDP from power. Thus, for the 2011 elections, 
the ACN opened merger talks with the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). 
The CPC was a splinter group from the ANPP whose emergence was due to 
irreconcilable elite differences. Unfortunately, the alliance did not materialize 
due to the unwillingness of the leaders of both parties to subsume their personal 
ambitions under more urgent national goals of creating robust opposition 
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platform at the very least.
58
 With six governorship positions, 17 Senatorial seats, 
and 67 House of Representatives seats after the 2011 general elections, the 
ACN became the face of opposition.  
Although the ACN was visible in the public consciousness since its 
merger due to its improved electoral fortunes and quick reaction to the 
contradictions of governance in the country, its political capacity to overthrow 
the PDP, electorally, was inadequate, thus raising the issue of broad-based 
merger. The strong showing of the CPC in the 2011 presidential election, where 
it polled 31.98% of the votes cast as against PDP’s 58.89%, ACN’s 5.41% and 
ANPP’s 2.40%, put it in a strong position politically.59 Another political 
advantage of the CPC was that its strength lay in the Northern states and it used 
it to neutralize the influence of the PDP there. The PDP managed to win the 
required 25% in most of the 16 main northern states.  
Preparatory to the 2015 general elections, five opposition political parties, 
namely ACN, CPC, ANPP, a splinter of the All Progressive Grand Alliance 
(APGA) and the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) engaged in merger talks, 
which they concluded in July 2013. This represented the most ambitious party 
merger since Nigeria’s independence and democratic experience. The merger 
produced a new opposition party called the All Progressives Congress (APC). 
The APC is interesting in several respects: firstly, the same set of political elites 
who had attempted, unsuccessfully, to pool their strength together in previous 
elections were behind it. Secondly, the new party was able to share party 
positions among the constituent parties successfully. This aspect had constituted 
the biggest challenge to merged parties in the past. Thirdly, the APC attracted 
PDP state governors and members of both chambers of the National Assembly, 
thus diminishing PDP’s majority status in the National Assembly. A total of five 
PDP state governors, 11 senators and 37 members of the House of Representatives 
defected to APC to swell its membership, especially in the National Assembly.
60
 
The creation of APC resuscitated the prospects of opposition politics and 
rekindled hopes of real political choices in the Nigerian polity. 
Alliances and mergers in Nigerian politics have always been a thorny 
issue and often pitted the elites against themselves. In the country’s first and 
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second republics, alliances were not deepened enough for them to be 
institutionalized. Thus, they failed to provide credible alternatives to unseat the 
incumbents or add buoyancy to opposition politics. Generally, the undoing of 
such alliances consisted mainly of intra-and inter-elite squabbles about the 
sharing formula for party and other positions. This was the undoing of the 
proposed alliance between the ACN and ANPP and another between ACN and 
CPC in the period before the 2011 general elections. For instance, in a letter 
dated 28 January 2011, which suspended merger talks between ACN and CPC, 
the then Chairman of the ACN, Bisi Akande accused the CPC of not 
demonstrating “sufficient seriousness and political will to forge a workable 
electoral cooperation.”61 Another factor that undermined earlier attempts at 
mergers and alliances was the impatience of the elites in taking over power. 
Once the electoral attempt to take over power failed, the entire edifice of 
opposition crumbled with many of the elite running back to the winning party 
for re-assimilation. This lack of ideological fixity accords with the prebendal 
nature of Nigerian politics.
62
 
Since the 2015 general elections, the Nigerian polity has been in a state of 
flux with defections from and to both the APC and PDP. Apart from the 
burgeoning mass disenchantment with the Buhari administration due to non-
delivery on his campaign promises, four recent events appear to signpost a 
litmus test for the continued electoral dominance of APC, namely the plan by 
some 19 small parties to merge into a “third force”, defection of Atiku 
Abubakar from APC to PDP, and a letter written by Olusegun Obasanjo to 
President Muhammadu Buhari which advised him not seek a re-election in 2019 
and also called on well-meaning Nigerians to form a coalition movement to 
redeem the country as APC had demonstrated incapacity to undertake the task 
of fruitful governance. As he put it, “we need a Coalition for Nigeria, CN. Such 
a Movement at this juncture needs not be a political party… [but] a coalition for 
democracy, good governance, social and economic well-being and progress. [A] 
coalition to salvage and redeem our country.”63 The fourth is the mass defection 
from APC by some governors and incumbent members of the National Assembly. 
Nigeria’s socio-economic condition has witnessed tremendous 
deterioration since 2015. At inception, President Muhammadu Buhari clearly 
set his major agenda as fighting corruption, solving Nigeria’s security 
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challenges, tackling unemployment, diversifying the economy, boosting the 
living standards of Nigerians and rolling back poverty.
64
 Undoubtedly, Nigeria’s 
declining macroeconomic fundamentals in terms of inflation and depreciated 
currency have eroded people’s purchasing power and translated into general 
hardship for them. According to an overview on the Nigerian economy by the 
African Economic Outlook, the inflation rate rose from 9.1% in 2015 to 15.7% 
on average in 2016 coupled with recession and massive decline in the 
manufacturing sector, all of which led to “an estimated 272 firms shutting down 
and industrial capacity utilisation dropping significantly from 51.4% in 2015 to 
35.4% in 2016.”65 
It is against the foregoing backdrop of economic hardships in Nigeria that 
opposition to APC is being mobilized. For instance, the preliminary discussions 
among small political parties to merge into a mega party as a “third force” were 
dictated by the seeming failure of APC. In the same vein, Atiku Abubakar’s 
reason for decamping from APC was due to the inability of the party to manage 
elite expectations and those of the masses. Instructively, his key grouse was the 
nepotic and clannish bent of the Buhari administration and the alienation of the 
elites from the other groups that merged to form the party.
66
  
Another critical event threatening the root of the APC was the letter 
written by Obasanjo in January 2018. Apart from drawing attention to the many 
shortcomings of the APC government such as failure to deliver on its promises, 
its clannish and nepotistic inclinations, lack of political will to deal with the 
menace of herdsmen and the prevalence of hopelessness, hunger, and despair, 
Obasanjo advised Buhari not to run for a re-election in 2019.
67
 Of course, it 
would take more than a letter to dissuade Buhari and his key supporters not to 
contest the 2019 presidential election.  
The recent trend in Nigerian polity points to the consolidation of two 
dominant parties. Despite the widespread belief that neither PDP nor APC could 
rescue Nigeria and the mainstream thinking that a third political force is 
required to give Nigerian electorates an array of choices, marginalized 
incumbent political elite have not seriously embraced new merger talks. As a 
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matter of fact, a recently formed party, People’s Trust (PT), which is showcased 
as a mega party cannot be regarded as a product of merger. The new party is 
made up of various groups that were, hitherto, not politically inclined. As 
Naseer Kura, the National Secretary of PT, asserts, “we are progressing towards 
gradual transformation; from a social movement to a political movement that 
might metamorphose into a political merger.”68 According to INEC sources, 
there are 91 registered political parties including People’s Trust. 
The multiplicity of parties in Nigeria implies that its polity is still 
characterized by a divided opposition. This way, it becomes impossible to pool 
resources together to displace the incumbent. The Nigerian political arena is still 
replete with ambitious politicians creating their own political parties to advance 
their personal political agenda. Democracy is not only measured by the quantity 
of competitors alone but also by their quality as well as the alternative policy 
choices and leadership options they present to the electorate. The current spate 
of party switching is what may be regarded as “big man decampment” which 
indicates that rather than political parties being channels of leadership recruitment, 
they serve as platforms for the pursuit of the ambitions of political elites.
69
  
In recent times, almost the same set of politicians that decamped from 
PDP in 2013 to help form APC and thus cause PDP to lose the 2015 presidential 
election switched their allegiance back to PDP. According to reports, three 
governors, over 15 incumbent senators and 36 members of the House of 
Representatives have already decamped.
70
 The implication of recent political 
events is that the institutionalization of the party system is taking some form, 
but is still characterized by a “big man” syndrome. In other words, electoral 
competitions are still driven and determined by issues related to personalities 
rather than ideas. Thus, there is no clear-cut ideological master plan by any 
political party upon which to judge them in the task of reconstructing the state. 
What is seen is ad hoc publicity of issues that currently appear to be of interest 
to frontline elites and informed masses.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In Africa, opposition parties were created with the mentality akin to 
setting up a business enterprise with political profit in mind. Thus, opposition 
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parties tend to be “closely identified with the party founder or current leader 
rather than with a political program and lack elaborated organizational 
underpinnings.”71 Flowing from the above, that is, that opposition parties are 
used as vehicles to advance personal political ambition among the country’s 
elites, it has been difficult to build stable and enduring coalitions that have the 
capacity to deepen and improve democratic credentials in the African continent.
72
 
Another character of the party system in Africa is the unusually large 
number of political parties with no known ideological leaning. Kuenzi and 
Lambright have contended that party fragmentation as manifested in a large 
effective number of parties has created governability problems in African 
democracies in terms of managing them.
73
 In Nigeria, there are currently 91 
registered political parties. Interestingly, only APC, PDP and APGA have 
representatives in the National Assembly with a few handfuls of other parties 
commanding insignificant membership in Houses of Assembly at the state level. 
The unusually large number of opposition parties presupposes fractionalization 
and fragmentation of the opposition with the result that they are incapable of 
carrying out the real role of providing a political counterweight to the 
incumbent party.
74
 
There is also the tendency of disenchanted politicians or those edged out 
in the power game to take solace in forming their own political parties. It is for 
this reason that many opposition parties “turn out to be little more than small 
and transient coteries behind aspiring individual politicians.”75 The moment 
they vie for positions and lose, the parties naturally fizzle out of existence. The 
alliance between the AD/APP, which was for the purpose of winning the 1999 
presidential elections, fizzled out when they lost the election.  
While the merger that produced the APC succeeded in winning the 
majority in the National Assembly as well as the presidency, it is not yet the 
eureka moment for party consolidation in Nigeria. There is mass 
disenchantment due to the disconnect between the campaign promises that APC 
made and the actual indices of achievement by the Buhari government. 
Available economic indices indicate the erosion of the living standards of the 
masses and widespread poverty. The poster child of the Buhari government, 
which is its fight against corruption, has been sorely faulted by Obasanjo as a 
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result of Buhari’s “culture of condonation and turning blind eye” to “errant 
members of his nepotic court” and by Matthew Kukah, a Catholic Bishop, as 
turning “governance in Nigeria [into] a criminalized enterprise.”76 Thus, while 
the masses want a “third force” political party, the disenchanted elite in APC have 
rather opted to decamp to PDP rather than mobilize a new political platform. 
Perhaps, the first step in ensuring political development that will enthrone 
an enduring political system in Nigeria is taking the issue of ideology in parties 
more seriously. What ideology will help to do is to imbue the elite with political 
discipline necessary to institutionalize authority and develop structures of power 
based on certain shared rules.
77
 In that way, merger politics will ensure political 
development, which in itself will disavow prebendalist and clientelist 
inclinations and spawn the quest to acquire power peacefully and to deploy 
power to empower the powerless by implementing the masterplan of the party.  
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